Summary

* Observed cooperation declines over time
* Punishment for not cooperating, via reputation made people cooperate
* Public good game – everyone has $5 and can put $0-$5 in for a group project, once distributed, then the money is doubled then redistributed
* indirect reciprocity - individuals who have helped others are given support, whereby the supporter builds up reputation
  + people are more likely to help someone with a high reputation
  + people decide who to give money to, more likely with high reputation
* alternate rounds between public good and indirect reciprocity resulted in more participation in the public goods game
* public goods participation went down if they were all at the end, too many in a row, or if there were no indirect reciprocity games inbetween

Good

* devised a test which gave a clear indication towards their hypothesis. It was fairly conclusive that given with their test subjects, alternating reputation gave a clear advantage, vs without.

Bad

* The test group was all 1st year students, meaning there was not a good diverse set of people, since they all come from similar walks of life
* The only info the participants had to base their decision on the reciprocity game was the public goods game
* The amount given might not have been enough for the participants to care about the end result

Extensions

* Do the same test, but with a more diverse group of people
* Play an additional game to give people more info other than from the public support game. Such as possibly donating money towards a color, or sport, or something else that people can base their donations on. To see whether the cooperation before matters more than something arbitrary